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ISBN: 9780691026374

[ED: Taschenbuch], [PU: PRINCETON UNIV PR], This book provides a new analysis of why relations between the United States and the Chinese Communists were so hostile in the first decade of the Cold War. Employing extensive documentation, it offers a fresh approach to long-debated questions such as why Truman refused to recognize the Chinese Communists, why the United States aided Chiang Kai-shek's KMT on Taiwan, why the Korean War escalated into a Sino-American conflict, and why Mao shelled islands in the Taiwan Straits in 1958, thus sparking a major crisis with the United States. Christensen first develops a novel two-level approach that explains why leaders manipulate low-level conflicts to mobilize popular support for expensive, long-term security strategies. By linking "grand strategy," domestic politics, and the manipulation of ideology and conflict, Christensen provides a nuanced and sophisticated link between domestic politics and foreign policy. He then applies the approach to Truman's policy toward the Chinese Communists in 1947-50 and to Mao's initiation of the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis. In these cases the extension of short-term conflict was useful in gaining popular support for the overall grand strategy that each leader was promoting domestically: Truman's limited-containment strategy toward the USSR and Mao's self-strengthening programs during the Great Leap Forward. Christensen also explores how such low-level conflicts can escalate, as they did in Korea, despite leaders' desire to avoid actual warfare. Review: ... [Christensen] makes a convincing and original argument that political leaders, in order to secure public support for their fundamental grand strategy, may have to adopt a more hostile foreign policy than they would prefer . . . This volume is indispensable for anyone interested in Sino-American relations. (Foreign Affairs) Table of contents: TR List of Figures and Tables TD ALIGN="RIGHT" TR Preface TD ALIGN="RIGHT" TR Note on Translation and Romanization TD ALIGN="RIGHT" TR Ch. 1 Introduction TD ALIGN="RIGHT"3 TR Ch. 2 Grand Strategy, National Political Power, and Two-Level Foreign Policy Analysis TD ALIGN="RIGHT"11 TR Ch. 3 Moderate Strategies and Crusading Rhetoric: Truman Mobilizes for a Bipolar World TD ALIGN="RIGHT"32 TR Ch. 4 Absent at the Creation: Acheson's Decision to Forgo Relations with the Chinese Communists TD ALIGN="RIGHT"77 TR Ch. 5 The Real Lost Chance in China: Nonrecognition, Taiwan, and the Disaster at the Yalu TD ALIGN="RIGHT"138 TR Ch. 6 Continuing Conflict over Taiwan: Mao, the Great Leap Forward, and the 1958 Quemoy Crisis TD ALIGN="RIGHT"194 TR Ch. 7 Conclusion TD ALIGN="RIGHT"242 TR App. A American Public Opinion Polls, 1947-1950 TD ALIGN="RIGHT"263 TR App. B Mao's Korean War Telegrams TD ALIGN="RIGHT"271 TR Bibliography TD ALIGN="RIGHT"277 TR Index TD ALIGN="RIGHT"305 352 pages - 1 halftone 16 line illus. 1 map 4 tables - 9 x 6 in Versandfertig in 2-4 Wochen, DE, [SC: 0.00], Neuware, gewerbliches Angebot, offene Rechnung (Vorkasse vorbehalten)

ISBN: 9780691026374

ID: 978069102637

This book provides a new analysis of why relations between the United States and the Chinese Communists were so hostile in the first decade of the Cold War. Employing extensive documentation, it offers a fresh approach to long-debated questions such as why Truman refused to recognize the Chinese Communists, why the United States aided Chiang Kai-shek''s KMT on Taiwan, why the Korean War escalated into a Sino-American conflict, and why Mao shelled islands in the Taiwan Straits in 1958, thus sparking a major crisis with the United States.Christensen first develops a novel two-level approach that explains why leaders manipulate low-level conflicts to mobilize popular support for expensive, long-term security strategies. By linking grand strategy, domestic politics, and the manipulation of ideology and conflict, Christensen provides a nuanced and sophisticated link between domestic politics and foreign policy. He then applies the approach to Truman''s policy toward the Chinese Communists in 1947-50 and to Mao''s initiation of the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis. In these cases the extension of short-term conflict was useful in gaining popular support for the overall grand strategy that each leader was promoting domestically: Truman''s limited-containment strategy toward the USSR and Mao''s self-strengthening programs during the Great Leap Forward. Christensen also explores how such low-level conflicts can escalate, as they did in Korea, despite leaders'' desire to avoid actual warfare. Thomas J. Christensen, Books, Social and Cultural Studies, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 Books>Social and Cultural Studies, Princeton University Press

ISBN: 0691026378

ID: 4827933

This book provides a new analysis of why relations between the United States and the Chinese Communists were so hostile in the first decade of the Cold War. Employing extensive documentation, it offers a fresh approach to long-debated questions such as why Truman refused to recognize the Chinese Communists, why the United States aided Chiang Kai-shek's KMT on Taiwan, why the Korean War escalated into a Sino-American conflict, and why Mao shelled islands in the Taiwan Straits in 1958, thus sparking a major crisis with the United States. Christensen first develops a novel two-level approach that explains why leaders manipulate low-level conflicts to mobilize popular support for expensive, long-term security strategies. By linking "grand strategy," domestic politics, and the manipulation of ideology and conflict, Christensen provides a nuanced and sophisticated link between domestic politics and foreign policy. He then applies the approach to Truman's policy toward the Chinese Communists in 1947-50 and to Mao's initiation of the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis. In these cases the extension of short-term conflict was useful in gaining popular support for the overall grand strategy that each leader was promoting domestically: Truman's limited-containment strategy toward the USSR and Mao's self-strengthening programs during the Great Leap Forward. Christensen also explores how such low-level conflicts can escalate, as they did in Korea, despite leaders' desire to avoid actual warfare. asian,international and world politics,international relations,political science,politics and government,politics and social sciences,social sciences,textbooks Asian, Princeton University Press

ISBN: 9780691026374

ID: 2545455

This book provides a new analysis of why relations between the United States and the Chinese Communists were so hostile in the first decade of the Cold War. Employing extensive documentation, it offers a fresh approach to long-debated questions such as why Truman refused to recognize the Chinese Communists, why the United States aided Chiang Kai-shek's KMT on Taiwan, why the Korean War escalated into a Sino-American conflict, and why Mao shelled islands in the Taiwan Straits in 1958, thus sparking a major crisis with the United States. Christensen first develops a novel two-level approach that explains why leaders manipulate low-level conflicts to mobilize popular support for expensive, long-term security strategies. By linking "grand strategy," domestic politics, and the manipulation of ideology and conflict, Christensen provides a nuanced and sophisticated link between domestic politics and foreign policy. He then applies the approach to Truman's policy toward the Chinese Communists in 1947-50 and to Mao's initiation of the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis. In these cases the extension of short-term conflict was useful in gaining popular support for the overall grand strategy that each leader was promoting domestically: Truman's limited-containment strategy toward the USSR and Mao's self-strengthening programs during the Great Leap Forward. Christensen also explores how such low-level conflicts can escalate, as they did in Korea, despite leaders' desire to avoid actual warfare. Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 Christensen, Thomas J., Princeton University Press

1996, ISBN: 9780691026374

ID: 761335

Softcover, Buch, [PU: Princeton University Press]