ISBN: 2940012611468

AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALSSECTION I. OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF MORALS.DISPUTES with men, pertinaciously obstinate in their principles, are,of all others, the most i… More...

AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALSSECTION I. OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF MORALS.DISPUTES with men, pertinaciously obstinate in their principles, are,of all others, the most irksome; except, perhaps, those with persons,entirely disingenuous, who really do not believe the opinions theydefend, but engage in the controversy, from affectation, from a spiritof opposition, or from a desire of showing wit and ingenuity, superiorto the rest of mankind. The same blind adherence to their own argumentsis to be expected in both; the same contempt of their antagonists; andthe same passionate vehemence, in inforcing sophistry and falsehood.And as reasoning is not the source, whence either disputant derives histenets; it is in vain to expect, that any logic, which speaks not to theaffections, will ever engage him to embrace sounder principles.Those who have denied the reality of moral distinctions, may be rankedamong the disingenuous disputants; nor is it conceivable, that any humancreature could ever seriously believe, that all characters and actionswere alike entitled to the affection and regard of everyone. Thedifference, which nature has placed between one man and another, isso wide, and this difference is still so much farther widened, byeducation, example, and habit, that, where the opposite extremes come atonce under our apprehension, there is no scepticism so scrupulous,and scarce any assurance so determined, as absolutely to deny alldistinction between them. Let a man's insensibility be ever so great,he must often be touched with the images of Right and Wrong; and lethis prejudices be ever so obstinate, he must observe, that others aresusceptible of like impressions. The only way, therefore, of convertingan antagonist of this kind, is to leave him to himself. For, findingthat nobody keeps up the controversy with him, it is probable he will,at last, of himself, from mere weariness, come over to the side ofcommon sense and reason.There has been a controversy started of late, much better worthexamination, concerning the general foundation of Morals; whetherthey be derived from Reason, or from Sentiment; whether we attainthe knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by animmediate feeling and finer internal sense; whether, like all soundjudgement of truth and falsehood, they should be the same to everyrational intelligent being; or whether, like the perception of beautyand deformity, they be founded entirely on the particular fabric andconstitution of the human species.The ancient philosophers, though they often affirm, that virtue isnothing but conformity to reason, yet, in general, seem to considermorals as deriving their existence from taste and sentiment. On theother hand, our modern enquirers, though they also talk much of thebeauty of virtue, and deformity of vice, yet have commonly endeavouredto account for these distinctions by metaphysical reasonings, and bydeductions from the most abstract principles of the understanding. Suchconfusion reigned in these subjects, that an opposition of the greatestconsequence could prevail between one system and another, and even inthe parts of almost each individual system; and yet nobody, till verylately, was ever sensible of it. The elegant Lord Shaftesbury, who firstgave occasion to remark this distinction, and who, in general, adheredto the principles of the ancients, is not, himself, entirely free fromthe same confusion.It must be acknowledged, that both sides of the question are susceptibleof specious arguments. Moral distinctions, it may be said, arediscernible by pure reason: else, whence the many disputes that reign incommon life, as well as in philosophy, with regard to this subject: thelong chain of proofs often produced on both sides; the examples cited,the authorities appealed to, the analogies employed, the fallaciesdetected, the inferences drawn, and the several conclusions adjusted totheir proper principles. Truth is disputable; not taste: what existsin the nature of things is the standard of our judgement; what eachman feels within himself is the standard of sentiment. Propositions ingeometry may be proved, systems in physics may be controverted; but theharmony of verse, the tenderness of passion, the brilliancy of wit, mustgive immediate pleasure. No man reasons concerning another's beauty; butfrequently concerning the justice or injustice of his actions. Digital Content>E-books>Literature>Literature>Literature, SAP Digital >16<

ISBN: 2940012611468

AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AN-ENQUIRY-CONCERNING-THE-PRINCIPLES-OF-MORALS~~David-Hume Literature>Literature>Literature NOOK Book (eBook), SAP